Abstract: I analyze Ojibway objections to genomics and genetics research on wild rice. Although key academic and industry participants in this research have dismissed their objections out of hand, my analysis supports the conclusion that the objections merit serious consideration, even by those who do not share the Ojibway's religious beliefs.
Introduction
When a natural resource plays an integral role in a group's cultural and spiritual heritage, it is especially problematic to fund and do research that will predictably marginalize that group's interests and undermine their ability to exercise authority over that resource. One way of protecting the group's interests and authority is to treat the resource in question as a common good that belongs to the group's common heritage. This will have implications for the obligations of those conducting, overseeing, and funding the research, and for the kinds of intellectual property claims other parties have over that resource. In this paper, I propose to explore these and related issues using a case study involving the Ojibway and genetic and genomics research on wild rice.
At the 2002 conference of the National Agricultural Biotechnology Council, the White Earth Land Recovery Project organized a protest against genomics and genetics research on wild rice taking place at the University of Minnesota and at the NorCal Wild Rice Company in California. 1 The protest was supported by resolutions from numerous Ojibway tribes and organizations, groups that attach tremendous economic, cultural, and spiritual importance to wild rice, or manoonmin, as it is called in their native tongue. 2 The following language from the Red Cliff Band (2002) resolution was typical: BE IT RESOLVED; that the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa does hereby oppose all patenting and genetic research being conducted on Wild Rice … [and] calls on all Natural Resources agencies to protect our property rights, which include Wild Rice, from risks by outlawing the research and the potential for a contaminated gene pool of Mother Earth's Wild Rice (not tame, sterile, or hybrids).
The National Agricultural Biotechnology Council (NABC) largely ignored the protests, and did not invite the protestors or other Ojibway stakeholders to participate in the conference, despite the fact that NABC's stated goals include: [providing] an open forum for persons with different interests and concerns to come together [and facilitating] active communication among researchers, administrators, policymakers, practitioners, and other concerned people to ensure that all viewpoints contribute to the safe and efficacious development of biotechnology for the benefit of society (NABC 2003) .
Similarly, the University of Minnesota's administration (though not some of the professors) has largely ignored requests by the tribes for input into the direction of the research, and has even ignored simple requests for information about what research is taking place (Sorensen 2002; White 2002) .
The president of NorCal, Ken Foster, dismissed the Ojibway's objections as being based on a simple misunderstanding of the research: "I don't understand why what we are doing would interfere with the spiritual aspect of wild rice. We are not trying to stop them from doing what they do" (Schmickle 2002) . Similarly, the associate dean of the University of Minnesota's College of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Sciences, Phillip Larsen, dismissed the objections because the researchers "are not doing anything to damage the sacredness of the crop" (Ruble 2002) . And Ron Phillips, one of the lead wild rice researchers at the University of Minnesota, has said that "there are different value systems at work here" (Schmickle 2002) , which suggests that finding common ground upon which to reach a rational consensus will be difficult, if not impossible. These attitudes exemplify the response that many scientists and industry representatives make to critics of other applications of modern biotechnology to food: critics are dismissed as being uninformed about the science and technology, and the objections are classified as religious or spiritual objections in an implied contrast to rational objections based on considerations of economics or food safety (Priest 2000; Streiffer and Hedemann 2005) .
I will argue, though, that the Ojibway's objections cannot be so easily dismissed, and that they merit serious consideration even by those who do not share the belief that "Manoonmin is a gift given to the Anishinaabe from Gichi Manidoo, the Creator" (LaDuke 2001a, 43) . To show this, I analyze the objections put forward in the resolutions, supplying context from news articles and other publicly available material distributed by the involved groups. Where the arguments are enthymatic, I draw on similar viewpoints in the academic literature on ethics and biotechnology. As a plausible reconstruction of the Ojibway's objections emerges, it will become apparent that many of the interests at stake are not peculiar to the Ojibway's value system, and that many of their objections are validated by the problematic histories of similar technologies.
In the resolutions, the groups object to five different activities. First, they object to the genomic mapping of wild rice. Second, they object to the genetic modification of wild rice. Although the University of Minnesota says it has no plans to genetically engineer wild rice, it has already developed nine modified strains through hybridization. Third, they object to the development of male sterility in domesticated wild rice, which NorCal has accomplished in two strains created through hybridization. Fourth, they object to the patenting of wild rice: NorCal has patents on two strains (Foster 1995; Foster and Zhu 1997) . And, fifth, they object to the labeling of either modified strains of wild rice or paddy-grown wild rice as "wild rice." Let us examine these in turn.
Genomics Research on Wild Rice
Much of the media discussion framed the Ojibway's objections as being primarily about the genomic mapping of wild rice. The first draft of the map was completed in 1999 (Kennard 1999 ) by researchers at the University of Minnesota, led by Phillips.
Two Uncharitable Interpretations
One might think that the Ojibway view genomic knowledge as what Gary Comstock (2003) has called "forbidden knowledge," knowledge that we should not acquire no matter how benign the means by which we do so and no matter how beneficial the knowledge itself might be. If this were their worry, then it would be easily dismissed; for example, it would not be unethical to acquire genomic knowledge of influenza if that would lead to its eradication. The surrounding discussion, though, makes it clear that concern about genomics research is really derivative upon another concern, namely that it will facilitate the genetic modification of wild rice, which is itself unethical.
Granting for now that genetically modifying wild rice is unethical, the most straightforward interpretation of this objection to genomics research appears to rely on a general principle: if research facilitates an unethical activity, then the research itself is unethical. If this were the most charitable interpretation, it would be easy enough to dismiss: research into steel production methods might facilitate the manufacture of illegal guns; that doesn't imply that the research itself is unethical.
But it would be disingenuous to interpret the objection in that way. Consider an analogy: if I object to a thief's firing his gun because his doing so will kill me, it would be disingenuous to interpret my objection as relying on the general principle that it is always wrong to kill me, even when I myself am the villainous aggressor. Rather, it is commonplace to phrase an objection to an activity in light of one salient feature of that activity, which explains why, in those particular circumstances, it is unethical. In so doing, one does not commit oneself to the further proposition that it is always unethical to perform any activity that has that feature.
Once we have set aside that general principle, there are any number of different ethical frameworks one might use to evaluate research that has problematic downstream consequences. I will briefly examine two: the Doctrine of Double Effect and Consequentialism.
The Doctrine of Double Effect and Research with Problematic Downstream Consequences
According to the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), it is always impermissible for an agent to intend the bad consequences of his action, either as a means or as an end (Anscombe 1998) . Thus, according to the DDE, research that has both good and bad consequences is permissible only if the researcher does not intend the bad consequences, either as a means or as an end.
On the assumption that the genetic modification of wild rice is unethical, how does the objection against genomics research on wild rice fare under the DDE? Clearly, not well: the researchers who engage in the genomic mapping intend to be facilitating future genetic modifications of wild rice. In the article in which Phillip's group published the genomic map of wild rice, the researchers stressed the importance of their achievement by noting that although "progress in breeding and genetics has been difficult," their map will provide an important "foundation for genetic and crop improvement studies" and "will be especially useful for genetics research and marker-assisted breeding" (Kennard 2000, 677-8) . Indeed, compared to other cereal crops, wild rice "is particularly poised to reap these benefits because it is just beginning to be domesticated" (Kennard 2000, 678) .
Consequentialism and Research with Problematic Downstream Consequences
According to Consequentialism, the relevant question for evaluating research with problematic downstream consequences is whether the net total value of the activity and its consequences is greater than the net total for the other options available to the agent. The fact that an activity will have the bad consequence of facilitating an unethical activity is only one morally relevant factor among many. In the remaining sections, it will emerge that with the exception of research on germplasm preservation that might be used to protect native rice in the face of disappearing natural stands, the alleged benefits (as detailed by, for example, Vance and Porter [2001] ) are really benefits for large-scale commercial producers. These producers, though, are in competition with smaller-scale Ojibway ricers, and their work threatens Ojibway interests in many ways.
Genetic Modification
The objection against genomics research on wild rice is derivative upon objections to the genetic modification of wild rice. So why do the Ojibway object to the genetic modification of wild rice? The resolutions and surrounding documents articulate four objections: that it will cause the economic dislocation of Ojibway ricers; that modified strains will contaminate Ojibway wild rice stands; that it violates the integrity of wild rice; and that it will allow the patenting of wild rice. I examine the first three in turn here. I discuss patenting directly in a later section.
Genetic Modification Will Facilitate Economic Dislocation of Ojibway Ricers
Concerns about economic dislocation are supported by the history of wild rice. In the 1940s, non-Ojibway developed their own processing plants and began harvesting wild rice using combine harvesters, thus initiating the decline of Ojibway involvement in wild rice production. By the late 1960s, non-Ojibway growers had succeeded in growing wild rice in paddies. Meanwhile, researchers at the University of Minnesota and the University of Wisconsin, Madison, developed nonshattering wild rice strains, better harvesting equipment, and better disease control, thus increasing large-scale commercial production of wild rice. By 1986, California producers had become so successful in growing paddy wild rice that there was a glut on the market. The resulting drop in prices undercut one of the most important stable sources of income for the remaining Ojibway ricers (Foster 1995, 3; Foster and Zhu 1997, 3; LaDuke 2001b) .
Continued genetic modification can be expected to cause further economic dislocation. The modified strains will likely exhibit traits that improve yield and make machine harvesting easier, allowing adopters to gain competitive advantages over non-adopters, and favoring large-scale producers over small-scale producers. Since Ojibway ricers are relatively smallscale producers, and many are reluctant to adopt new technologies (Vennum 1988, 224, 226-7) , genetic modification will likely be to their detriment. Moreover, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has allowed modified and paddy grown wild rice to be called "wild rice" without qualification. This makes it difficult for Ojibway ricers to capitalize on whatever economic advantages might have resulted from a distinctive market for their own strains of wild rice harvested according to traditional methods (LaDuke 2001b) . Increased economic dislocation of Ojibway ricers thus seems likely. Since economic harms that result from technological advances are ethically problematic even if they are unintended (Hausman 1989; 1992) , deciding to put public resources towards research that facilitates the dislocation of Ojibway ricers is itself ethically problematic, especially given the history of unjust treatment of the Ojibway (McKlurken 2000; Wildenthal 2003) .
Genetic Modification and Contamination
The second objection to genetically modifying wild rice is that the modified strains will contaminate the Ojibway's own rice stands. Some degree of contamination seems likely. Organic foods are frequently contaminated with genetically engineered ingredients despite preventative measures (Giles 2004) , and in the case of StarLink corn, the largest case of contamination to date, the contamination was widespread despite the fact that the amount of StarLink planted was relatively small (Lin 2003) .
There are at least three reasons why contamination is problematic for Ojibway ricers. First, the modifications to wild rice have resulted in a product that is inferior in taste and quality. Contamination, then, might cause economic harms due to a loss of product quality. Second, in the absence of a license, even the unintentional sale of patented wild rice within the U.S. constitutes patent infringement. This means that even if contamination by patented strains occurs unintentionally and unknowingly, those who try to grow or sell their product within U.S. territory would be opening themselves up to financial liability.
Contamination can also cause non-economic harms. The publication by David Quist and Ignaclo Chapela (2001) that traditional maize landraces in Mexico had been contaminated with transgenic DNA prompted widespread discussion of many of the noneconomic social and cultural values at stake. The report on the contamination by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America concluded that evaluating the possible harms of the contamination required taking into account "the central role of maize in Mexico's history and culture, including the beliefs and value systems of indigenous people" (2004, 16) .
Wild rice similarly has significant cultural, symbolic, and spiritual roles for the Ojibway. As Vennum says, "Traditional Ojibway life elevates rice above being good simply for consumption or barter. Stories and legends, reinforced by the ceremonial use of manoomin and taboos and proscriptions against eating it at certain times, show the centrality of wild rice to Ojibway culture" (1988, (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) . Ceremonial and other non-market uses of wild rice are likely to be disrupted if rice stands are contaminated with rice that the Ojibway believe, rightly or wrongly, unsuitable.
Thus, contamination threatens the quality of Ojibway-produced wild rice, could make the Ojibway vulnerable to financial liability, and could disrupt many of their non-market uses of wild rice.
Genetic Modification Threatens the Integrity of Wild Rice
The third objection to the genetic modification of wild rice is that it violates the integrity of wild rice.
This objection is an instance of a more general objection to all forms of genetic modification, and one that is frequently criticized in the literature. Bernard Rollin, for example, argues that one can only violate that which can be harmed, and only sentient entities can be harmed (1995, . But many nonsentient things can be harmed, and it is reasonable to think that such harm can be morally relevant (Goodpaster 1978; Streiffer and Hedemann 2005) . Others would reject this objection on the grounds that it presupposes that species boundaries are fixed, not fluid (Comstock 2000) . But there is no reason to suppose that something can have integrity, in a morally relevant sense, only if its boundary is fixed (Streiffer 2003) . Moreover, maintaining the integrity of wild rice might implicate the Ojibway's religious liberties: because it is reasonable for the Ojibway to want unmodified wild rice for use in their cultural, spiritual, and religious ceremonies, it interferes with their religious practices to contaminate their traditional rice beds. A full discussion of the integrity argument would take us too far afield; suffice it to say that it cannot be dismissed as easily as some think.
The Development of Male Sterility
In addition to a general objection about genetically modifying wild rice, the resolutions also object more specifically to NorCal's development of male-sterile strains of wild rice.
3 NorCal expects that their methods will allow the development of superior performing hybrid strains of wild rice that will "greatly accelerate the usage of this crop and could increase both yield and quality characteristics" (Foster 1995; Foster and Zhu 1997) . Since Ojibway will be reluctant to avail themselves of this technology, it can only be expected to contribute to the problems of economic dislocation discussed above.
Patenting of Wild Rice
The fourth activity the resolutions oppose is the patenting of wild rice. After sketching the legal background of patents and their justification, I will discuss the three objections that seem to be most prominent in the wild rice discussion, one based on concerns about inappropriate ownership, one based on concerns about so-called biopiracy, and one based on the idea that wild rice should be treated as part of the Ojibway's common heritage.
Patents and their Justification
A patent gives its holder the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented item for a term of twenty years from the filing date. Infringement of this right is held to a standard of strict liability: even someone who has no way of knowing that they are infringing a patent can still be found liable for damages.
There are two justifications for patents. The Economic Incentives Argument asserts that patents provide economic incentives for research and development. By allowing the patent holder to exclude others from the market for their invention, the holder can charge higher, monopolistic pricing for the duration of the patent. Thus, the possibility of patents provides higher expected profits, which increases incentives to fund research and development in patentable areas.
The Economic Incentives Argument is problematic, though, because it is insensitive to whether the economic benefits produced are distributed equitably and because of a lack of data about the overall effects of patents on investment and research (Svatos 1996; Streiffer forthcoming) . It is therefore usually buttressed by the Fairness Argument, which asserts that patents are required to prevent unfair free-riding. For example, without patents, if a pharmaceutical company spends $500 million developing a new drug, a second company could analyze the drug and make it themselves, unfairly avoiding all of the initial research and development costs while reaping substantial benefits.
As mentioned, genetic modification has already allowed NorCal to obtain patents on two strains of wild rice. There is reason to expect intellectual property rights to be granted on additional modifications that might be accomplished in the future. The results of more traditional methods of modification, such as selective breeding and hybridization, can be protected under the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Plant Protection Act, and the results of genetic engineering can be protected using much stronger §101 utility patents (Merges 1997, 51-61, 157-75) . Universities will be motivated by the Bayh-Dohl Act, and commercial entities will be motivated by expected profits, to seek intellectual property protections for their modified strains. The real question with regard to patenting wild rice is not whether it is likely to continue, but why the Ojibway object to it.
It should be noted at the outset that patenting genetic resources of any kind is controversial at the present time (see, for example, Eisenberg [2002] and the accompanying commentaries). And this is true even among those who do not believe that the item from which the genetic resources were obtained is sacred. So although I focus here on objections articulated in the wild rice discussion, these concerns only amount to one part of a much larger controversy.
The Ownership Objection to Patenting
The Ownership Objection begins with the claim that it is unethical to own wild rice. Many Ojibway have views about the respect owed to living things in general, and especially to wild rice, that makes ownership over plants and wild rice ethically problematic. Leslie Ramczyk (2005), a Lac Court Oreilles Ojibway tribal member who teaches ethnobotany at the Lac Court Oreilles Ojibwa Community College, characterizes the view in these words:
All plants have a life and spirit just as all other things. I try to extend courtesy and respect to the plants most of the time. I sense their life and spirituality and know that if they did not share this with me I would not survive…. No individual, be it plant, animal, or any other being can "own" something. There is only sharing, sometimes this sharing is done willingly sometimes not, but it is sharing.
According to the Ownership Objection, then, patents are unethical because they constitute ownership over wild rice.
It might be objected, though, that patents do not constitute ownership of anything tangible (so-called "real property"); they only allow one to exclude others from making, using, etc., the patented item. Thus, someone could hold a patent on an object that has never been manufactured, and if so, patenting does not constitute ownership of any real property, since in such a case there simply is no real property to be owned.
But this objection is inconclusive since it ignores the possibility that when there is real property, a patent does constitute partial ownership of the real property. Ownership of real property is constituted by a bundle of rights and the bundle is highly elastic. People can own something without having all, or any specific subset of, the rights in the normal bundle. If I own a bit of real property, but you have the right to prevent me from using it, selling it, etc., then it seems correct to say that you have (partial) ownership of it. This response is supported by the Patent Office itself, which has argued that it will not give patents on human beings because doing so would violate the constitutional prohibition on slavery (Weiss 1999) .
It might also be objected that Ojibway tradition allows ownership of wild rice (see, for example, Vennum 1988, 82-83) . This is true, but there are two key differences between the ownership of wild rice by the Ojibway and the ownership of wild rice by those who patent it. First, although Ojibway tradition allows ricers to reserve areas to be harvested by binding the rice into bundles, and it allows ownership of harvested rice, the rice beds themselves are communally owned. From the rice beds, "each individual was free to harvest as much or as little as desired" (Vennum 1988, 266) , and no one's ownership rights could be used to prevent someone else from accessing wild rice in the way that patent rights allow. Thus, ownership protected by patents is more exclusory than the ownership allowed by Ojibway tradition.
Second, ownership of wild rice by the Ojibway is accompanied by different attitudes:
The Indians' whole legal system in regard to wild rice involved protecting it; from their vantage, whites seem interested only in exploiting the product by whatever means, including enacting laws to gain the upper hand. … Unable to appreciate the deeper meaning of manoomin in Ojibway life, they paid little attention to its ceremonial use, were oblivious to the role of wild rice in legends, regard the rice camps as mere social diversions interfering with the harvest, and generally considered the lack of concentrated effort to gather every grain possible an indication of Indian indolence or stupidity (Vennum 1988, 267) .
And predictably enough, the difference between the attitude of use with respect and protection, on the one hand, and the attitude of commercial exploitation, on the other, has historically carried with it a concomitant difference in consequences for the resource in question:
Where whites have succeeded in gaining control of the production of staples formerly Indian (in the commercial overfishing of sturgeon in the boundary waters area, for instance), the results have often been ecologically disastrous (Vennum, 267) .
The Biopiracy Objection to Patenting
The second objection to patenting wild rice is that it amounts to biopiracy. Michael Hansen of the Consumer Policy Institute describes the problematic activity this way:
The most immediate impact [of the creation of modified strains of wild rice] for Native Americans is the patenting of traditional crops by bio-tech companies, whose representatives arrive at a tribal location, access an elder, acquire whatever information they can regarding the history and characteristics of a particular crop and then patent it as their own (Kent n.d.) .
Biopiracy raises concerns about fairness and about control over wild rice. The concern about fairness arises because the monetary benefits of patents need not be shared with the Ojibway despite their role in the cultivation and care of wild rice. The patent system protects discrete improvements disclosed in written publications, made by identifiable researchers, and involving the latest research methods and technologies. It is ill suited to protecting traditional knowledge, accumulated gradually and communally over the span of many generations, especially where the knowledge is primarily transmitted orally. If the unfairness of free-riding is what justifies patents, then the unfairness of companies free-riding off of the Ojibway is equally objectionable.
However, the concern that patents allow the biotech companies to control the Ojibway's use of wild rice is problematic unless duly qualified. First, patents are only valid in the jurisdiction in which they are granted. A U.S. patent would not be enforceable against Ojibway ricers operating on a reservation, even if those ricers were growing modified wild rice protected by patents. However, it would be enforceable against ricers trying to grow or sell even unintentionally contaminated wild rice off the reservation. Second, it is arguable that patents do not cover naturally occurring entities and instead only cover substantially modified version of entities found in nature (the so-called Product of Nature Doctrine). NorCal, for example, spent fifteen years altering wild rice so that it would be male-sterile; so it is patentable, whereas naturally occurring wild rice is not. Whether the Patent Office really respects the Product of Nature Doctrine, however, is contentious. Mark Sagoff, for example, has argued that "products of nature, such as genes, have been considered patentable even though they are plainly parts of nature" (Sagoff 2002, 13) . And even if Sagoff is mistaken, contamination of traditional wild rice beds by patented strains, as discussed above, would still cause problems for Ojibway ricers.
The Common Heritage Objection to Patenting
The third objection to the patenting of wild rice is that it amounts to the privatization of a common good that belongs to Ojibway's common heritage. Suzanne Nelson, director of the Conservation of Native Seeds/SEARCH, says, "I don't believe that companies should be able to own genetic resources, or individuals for that matter, or tribes. These are really a common heritage for all of us" (Kent n.d.) . Although Nelson claims that the genetic resources of wild rice are a common heritage for all of us, it is the heritage of the Ojibway themselves that it really belongs to. Pilar Ossorio usefully distinguishes between two different but often conflated principles that might be appealed to by someone invoking a common heritage argument, the Common Heritage Duties Doctrine, and the Common Heritage Property Doctrine (Ossorio 1999) .
According to the Duties Doctrine, there should be legal duties to preserve, protect, and allow access to objects with special significance for a people and their heritage (for example, historic buildings, cultural artifacts, and natural wonders). The Bad River Band seems to be taking this preservationist perspective, since they exempt from their resolution wild rice research that "is conducted for and by the Bad River or entities authorized by Bad River and which is necessary to identify and protect wild strains (Bad River Band 2002).
On the face of it, though, the Duties Doctrine seems consistent with patents on wild rice. The mere fact that a person has the right to exclude others from using, making, selling, etc., a kind of thing is consistent with that person being under a variety of legal duties to protect and preserve that thing. Moreover, if the Product of Nature Doctrine is true, then patents cannot be obtained on unmodified wild rice; they can only be obtained on modified strains or on genes isolated from wild rice and modified so as to be moveable into other organisms (Ossorio 2002) . Thus, that which is patented is not itself plausibly thought of as belonging to anyone's common heritage.
Even so, if the Economic Incentives Argument is correct, there remains a tension between patenting and the Duties Doctrine, since the commercialization that patents encourage may well be detrimental to conservation efforts for the reasons discussed above.
The Property Doctrine focuses not on the preservation of a resource, but rather on providing those whose heritage it belongs to a fair opportunity for its exploitation and a fair distribution of resulting benefits. Communal farmland, for example, is a paradigm example of something that ought to be protected by the Property Doctrine. Everyone in the community ought to have fair access to it and the benefits should be distributed fairly. It should be managed for the common good of those in the community. Because patents allow one person to exclude access by everyone else, the Property Doctrine provides clear grounds for thinking that patents on wild rice are unethical, especially if they are held by non-Ojibway. If the Property Doctrine were consistently applied to wild rice, it would also require remediation of the unfairness implicit in biopiracy.
Labeling Issues
The final activity objected to in the resolutions is labeling modified or paddy grown wild rice simply as "wild rice." This misleadingly implies that those products are the same as true wild rice, and results in economic losses to the Ojibway from consumers not realizing the difference.
FDA regulations require that labels be truthful and not misleading, and it seems obvious that it is misleading to use the phrase "wild" to describe something that has been genetically modified by people and grown in a paddy as opposed to its natural environment. Although Minnesota enacted legislation to explicitly prevent this, California, the largest grower of wild rice, has not, and their exported products are sold in Minnesota. So this is a clear case of misbranding that is unfair to traditional wild rice producers. Unfortunately, the FDA's interpretation of the "truthful and not misleading" standard is weak and frequently unenforced (Streiffer and Rubel 2004) .
Conclusion
The reconstructed objections can be summarized as follows. The genomics research on wild rice is unethical because it will facilitate the genetic modification of wild rice, which is itself unethical. The genetic modification of wild rice is unethical for four reasons. First, it will exacerbate the economic dislocation of Ojibway wild ricers, especially in light of the development of male-sterile strains of wild rice by NorCal and in light of the fact that the FDA allows modified and paddy grown rice to be sold under the label of "wild rice." Second, modification will result in contamination of traditional rice beds, which could lower product quality, expose Ojibwa ricers to legal liability for patent infringement, and cause noneconomic harms due to the cultural importance of wild rice to the Ojibway. Third, modification violates the integrity of wild rice. And fourth, modification will allow patenting on wild rice, which constitutes inappropriate ownership, opens the door to legal liability worries, and ignores the fact that wild rice is part of the Ojibway's common heritage.
Although some of the objections can be interpreted as relying on implausible moral principles, such interpretations are uncharitable at best, and disingenuous at worst. The concerns raised are validated by the problematic history of similar technologies, mirror many of the concerns discussed in the larger public debate about the application of biotechnology to food and to genetic resources, and are by no means limited to those who share the belief that wild rice is sacred. Moreover, the cultural importance of wild rice, in combination with the history of past injustices that the U.S. and other parties have inflicted on the Ojibway, adds to the weight of many of their objections. Respect for their autonomy, well-being, and cultural and spiritual traditions requires that NorCal, the University of Minnesota, and other stakeholders involved make a serious attempt to evaluate the effects their own activities are having on Ojibway stakeholders, and to accept the Ojibway's attempts to engage in a constructive, mutually respectful dialogue. those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Endnotes
1. The National Agricultural Biotechnology Council is a group of some thirty-five research institutions, mostly universities, involved in agricultural biotechnology. The White Earth Land Recovery Project was founded by Winona LaDuke, a member of the White Earth Ojibway tribe. Its stated mission is "to facilitate recovery of the original land base of the White Earth Indian Reservation, while preserving and restoring traditional practices of sound land stewardship, language fluency, community development, and strengthening our spiritual and cultural heritage" (White Earth Land Recovery Project 2004) . 2. The Ojibway are also referred to as the Chippewa or, in their native tongue, the Anishinaabe. They were one of the largest groups of Native Americans, living in the Great Lakes Region and southern Canada. Groups that provided resolutions include the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, the Iron Range Area Council for Native Americans, the White Earth Band, the 1854 Authority, the Fond du Lac Reservation Business Committee, and the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwa. 3. A male-sterile plant does not produce the necessary pollen to fertilize itself and is used in breeding programs to avoid the large amounts of hand-labor that would otherwise be necessary to prevent selfpollinating plants from contributing their own genes to their offspring. Usually, the offspring of male-sterile seeds are themselves infertile and so cannot be used to reproduce, but NorCal has developed a method that allows the efficient reproduction of male-sterile seeds. They also have developed a method to use those seeds to cross inbred lines of wild rice in a way that avoids the typical negative effects of inbreeding.
